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Preface 
This paper is written as a part of the project “Regulation, control and auditing”, funded 
by the Norwegian Research Council and the project “The Norwegian Central 
government in a 30 years perspective”, funded by the Melzer Foundation. The paper 
was presented at the session on Regulation and Governance at ECPR Conference in 
Pisa, 6-8 September 2007. We wish to thank The Norwegian Social Science Data 
Services that has conducted the survey, and especially Vidar W. Rolland and John-Erik 
Ågotnes for valuable help. 
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Summary 
This paper examines whether the OECD regulatory model corresponds with regulatory 
practice in Norway. It describes and analyzes whether civil servants in central agencies 
working with regulatory tasks differ from other civil servants when it comes to the 
importance of professional considerations and signals from their parent ministry and 
political executives, whether they have different contact patterns, and whether their 
assessment of the influence of political executives and their parent ministry varies. It 
also analyzes whether the variation in signals, contact patterns and perceived influence 
of different actors is sustained when structural and cultural features are taken into 
account. The empirical data base is a survey of civil servants in Norwegian central 
agencies conducted in 2006. One main finding is that regulatory practice is much more 
complex then the OECD model suggests. The most important factor for explaining the 
relationship between agencies and political and administrative superiors is the degree of 
political salience of the issues concerned. 
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Sammendrag 
Dette notatet undersøker om OECD’s reguleringsmodell samsvarer med den norske 
reguleringspraksisen. Det beskriver og analyserer omansatte i norske direktorater og 
tilsyn som arbeider med regulerings- og kontrolloppgaver skiller seg fra andre ansatte 
når det gjelder vektlegging av faglige hensyn og signal fra overordnet departement og 
politisk ledelse, om de har ulike kontaktnettverk, og om deres vurdering av politisk 
ledelses og overordnet departements innflytelse varierer. Det analyseres også om 
variasjonene i signaler, kontaktmønster og innflytelsesrelasjoner opprettsholdes når det 
kontrolleres for strukturelle og kulturelle trekk. Datagrunnlaget er en survey til ansatte i 
norske direktorater og tilsyn i 2006. Et hovedfunn er at reguleringspraksisen er langt 
mer kompleks enn det OECD modellen forutsetter. Den viktigste faktoren for å 
forklare relasjonene mellom direktoratene og deres overordnende politiske og 
administrative organer er graden av politisk oppmerksomhet og debatt på eget 
saksområde. 
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Introduction 
In recent years a comprehensive program of regulatory reform has been launched 
internationally (cf. OECD 2002a). It prescribes a high and increasing degree of 
autonomy for regulatory agencies, moving them away from the political executive and 
ministerial administrative leaders. There is, however, an inherent tension in regulatory 
reform, stemming from its dual prescription of both enhanced autonomy and more 
control. On the one hand, supervisory agencies are supposed to gain more autonomy, 
both from political executives and market actors. On the other hand, central political 
control is expected to be enhanced by a strengthening of frame or strategic steering and 
regulatory power (Christensen and Lægreid 2004).  
In this paper we examine whether the new regulatory doctrine, prescribing a 
relinquishing of control vis-à-vis state agencies responsible for regulation, has an 
empirical foundation, meaning enhanced institutional autonomy in practice, or whether 
there is still a lot of control of these agencies or possibly a combination of simultaneous 
control and autonomy. The challenge is to find ways of making agency autonomy and 
democratic accountability complementary and mutually reinforcing rather than 
competing values (Christensen and Lægreid 2006). 
The international regulatory reform program has also affected Norway. As part of 
this development, the Norwegian government in recent years formulated a new 
regulatory policy designed to strengthen supervisory agencies and make them more 
autonomous, to relocate some agencies and to clarify their regulatory role through 
increased horizontal specialization of functions and tasks (St. meld. nr. 17 2002-2003). 
The new Norwegian model is, however, not a blueprint of the OECD regulatory model, 
but has been translated and adapted to the Norwegian political-administrative tradition. 
Our main research question concerns the autonomy of regulatory agencies from their 
parent ministry, a cornerstone of regulatory reform. Are relations between civil servants 
working mainly with regulatory tasks and their parent ministry different from those of 
other civil servants when it comes to signals, contact patterns and influence? We are 
particularly interested in how characteristics of agencies, seen in terms of civil servants’ 
tasks and their structural, cultural and demographic features, make a difference to their 
perceived autonomy in practice.1 Thus, the goals of this paper are: 
1) To describe and analyze whether civil servants working with regulatory tasks in             
central agencies differ from other civil servants when it comes to: 
a) the importance of professional considerations and signals from their parent    
ministry and political executives;  
 b) contact patterns with their parent ministry and political executives;  
 c) their assessment of the influence of political executives and their parent 
 ministry.   
                                                 
1 This is an alternative to focusing only on all civil servants in regulatory agencies.The reasons for not choosing this 
option are that civil servants in regulatory agencies have different tasks, and that some agencies, even though they 
do not have a regulatory label, may nevertheless have regulatory functions among their tasks.  
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2)  To analyze whether any possible variation in signals, contacts and influence between 
type of agency and tasks is sustained when the structural and cultural features of the 
agencies are taken into account. 
 
We emphasize whether task-specific features and especially regulatory tasks affect the 
relationship between the agency and its superior ministry and political executives in the 
direction specified by the new regulatory policy coming from the OECD, or whether 
there is a specifically Norwegian brand of regulatory practice stemming from a more 
mixed regulatory model. To do this we also look at structural and cultural features of the 
Norwegian civil service to understand the complex relationship between agencies and 
their superior bodies.  
The empirical basis is a broad survey of Norwegian civil servants in central agencies 
carried out in 2006. The main set of dependent variables is the various dimensions of 
the relationship between agencies and their parent ministry viewed in terms of the 
importance of different types of signals, contact patterns and influence. Since Norway 
experienced a regulatory reform in 2002-2003, we also use data from a similar survey 
conducted in 1996 to see whether there have been changes over time in the way 
regulatory tasks are handled.  
We will first discuss some central concepts like agency, regulation and regulatory 
agency. Second, we will present the Norwegian context of agencification and regulatory 
reform. Third, we will outline three theoretical perspectives, focusing on different 
explanatory variables, and formulate hypotheses on the importance of agency task and 
other independent variables for signals, contact and influence. Fourth, we will briefly 
describe the database and the methodology. Fifth, we will discuss whether civil servants 
with regulatory tasks are different from other civil servants with regard to signals, 
contact patterns and influence relations. Sixth, we will draw other explanatory variables 
into the discussion. Finally, we will draw some conclusions and discuss our findings in a 
broader context, relating them to some other studies.  
Central Concepts: Agencies, Regulation and 
Regulatory Policy 
Recently, academic discussions on autonomy and control of state organizations have 
focused on the development of agencies. We will follow Pollitt et al.’s (2004) definition 
of central agencies as part of the civil service, but structurally devolved from the 
ministries. They carry out public tasks on a permanent basis, are staffed by civil servants, 
are subject to public law procedures and are normally financed mainly by the state 
budget. They have some autonomy from the ministries in policy decision-making and in 
personnel, financial and management matters, but they are not totally independent.  
Many countries have followed the lead of the OECD and implemented regulatory 
reforms that give agencies more autonomy and formally make the role of regulatory 
agencies less ambiguous, both internally and in relation to other regulatory agencies, 
public authorities and the subjects of regulation, because of purification of tasks 
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(Christensen and Lægreid 2006a, OECD 2002a). In 1995, the OECD launched a 
regulatory reform program whose main components were the regulation of the market, 
competition policy, and the establishment of independent regulatory agencies. It 
assessed regulatory policy in all member countries with the aim of improving the quality 
of regulation by fostering competition, efficiency and performance. The concept of 
“distributed public governance” refers to the emergence of quasi-independent, non-
majoritarian and non-governmental organizations (Flinders 2004, OECD 2002a). The 
doctrine is that regulatory agencies are most effective if they are independent from the 
ministry, operate according to a clear regulatory policy and are staffed by experts 
(OECD 1997, 2002a, 2002b).2 In line with this, evidence-based decision-making is to 
replace the informal, consensus-based approach to regulatory processes that was 
previously the normal policy style in countries like Norway (OECD 2003).  
Contemporary agency reform efforts tend to prescribe role purification, whereby 
policy formulation, service delivery, purchasing and regulation are supposed to be split 
up and allocated to specific agencies according to the principle of ‘single-purpose 
organizations’, thus increasing horizontal specialization both within and between public 
organizations (Boston et al. 1996). In contrast to the former integrated model in which 
regulation was one of many tasks and a by-product of other relationships, the new 
model creates specialized agencies responsible for regulation and inspection with 
explicitly allocated resources. Whether these agencies carry out their specialized 
functions in only one sector or across sectors varies, however (Christensen and Lægreid 
2002). 
In a narrow sense, regulation means formulating authoritative sets of rules and 
setting up autonomous public agencies or other mechanisms for monitoring, 
scrutinizing and promoting compliance with these rules (Baldwin et al. 1998, Jordana 
and Levi-Faur 2004). The establishment of autonomous regulatory agencies brought 
about by the regulatory reform movement is connected to this meaning of regulation. In 
this paper we are concerned primarily with the definition of regulation as a) goal 
formulation, rule-making and standard-setting; b) monitoring, information-gathering, 
scrutiny, inspection, audit and evaluation; and c) enforcement, behaviour-modification 
and the application of rewards and sanctions (Hood, Rothstein and Baldwin 2001). 
Normally civil servants with regulatory and supervisory tasks are at arm’s length from 
the organizations they oversee, whether public or private, and also semi-independent 
from their superior political authorities. 
Not all agencies are regulatory agencies: some are primarily responsible for 
managerial tasks, while others provide services or offer policy advice. In fact, mixed or 
multi-functional roles were for a long time normal for many agencies in many countries 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2007). One of the main tasks of regulatory agencies is to 
control the power of the market, ensure fair competition and protect consumers and 
citizens by guiding and implementing policy regulation. One of their features is that they 
often seem to have both statutory power and incorporated status. These bodies carry 
                                                 
2 Independence may mean some slightly different things concerning regulatory agencies. One the one hand, some 
countries see regulatory agencies as part of the central civil service, as indicated by Pollitt et. al. (2004), while others 
see their autonomy as more extended and the agencies as further removed from central government. 
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out regulation using their own delegated regulatory power, resources and 
responsibilities. They are neither directly elected by the people nor directly managed by 
elected officials (Gilardi 2004; Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002).3  
The Norwegian Context 
Norway is a small, unitary, parliamentary, and multiparty state. From the early 1970s 
until the fall of 2005, when a Red-Green majority government came to power, it has 
been mainly run by minority government. In a comparative perspective, Norway has 
relatively strong collectivistic and egalitarian values, is consensus-oriented and has well-
developed corporatist arrangements (Christensen 2003a). It also has one of the most 
comprehensive and universal welfare states in the world, with a large public sector. The 
relationship between parliament, ministers and agencies is based on the principle of 
ministerial responsibility, meaning that the minister is responsible to the parliament for 
all activities within his or her policy area in the ministry as well as in subordinate bodies. 
Political control over the civil service has, however, historically been rather general and 
passive, allowing the executive a lot of leeway. This seems to reflect some major features 
of the political-administrative system: high levels of mutual trust and shared attitudes 
and norms among political and administrative leaders and within the public sector 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2005). There is also a high degree of transparency and an 
open attitude towards critical scrutiny by the media. 
Agencies have been a major organizational form in the Norwegian central 
government for a long time, representing an enduring historical conflict between the 
political executive and professional groups. The agency tradition goes back to the 1850s 
when the first autonomous professional agencies (called directorates) outside the 
integrated and jurist-dominated hierarchical ministries were established, primarily in the 
communications sector (Christensen and Roness 1999). In the mid-1950s the 
government stated a new principle for agency structure and increased the number of 
independent agencies. The idea was that the more technical issues and routine tasks 
should be moved to the agencies, while policy and planning tasks should stay within the 
ministries. The new doctrine resulted in the establishment of several new agencies over 
the next 15 years, but this development slowed down in the 1970s, because of the oil 
crisis and increased political scepticism towards independent agencies. 
The dominant agency model in Norway has historically been rather unified 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2004). In most agencies administrative tasks, regulatory and 
control tasks, and service provision and production tasks have been combined and 
integrated. Traditionally, Norway has not had any type of administrative court. Appeals 
are directed to the parent ministry, which can also instruct the agencies. The idea that 
there ought to be separate agencies for different tasks is rather new, while some of the 
agencies have enjoyed enhanced authority for some time, mainly in financial and 
personnel matters, but also in some substantive areas (Lægreid et al. 2003). 
                                                 
3 The American tradition of regulatory agencies is slightly different in some respects, even though imitated in Europe. 
Quite often heads of regulatory agencies in the US are appointed on a political basis and act as quasi-political 
actors, while directors of European regulatory agencies more often are pure career administrative leaders. 
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Over the past 15 years, a process of gradual structural devolution has been going on 
in the Norwegian central government, and the independent agency model has become 
more differentiated (Christensen and Lægreid 2003). This development was partly 
inspired by New Public Management ideas and solutions, but was also a part of 
Norway’s adaptation to the EU and the internal market.4 The new model combines 
vertical specialization, whereby agencies formally gain more authority, with increased 
horizontal specialization, whereby the distribution of roles and tasks among agencies is 
more differentiated and non-overlapping. The organizational changes can be seen as an 
active instrumental administrative reform process influenced by external ideological 
pressure from the New Public Management movement and constrained by internal 
historical-institutional norms, values and the context of the Norwegian political-
administrative system (Christensen and Lægreid 2001). 
Norway was assessed by the OECD regulatory task force in 2003 with a view to 
introducing reforms that would foster competition, innovation, economic growth and 
important social objectives (OECD 2003). The OECD acknowledged that the Nordic 
incremental, consensus-oriented model of governance, emphasizing egalitarian values, a 
high level of mutual trust, solidarity, high standards of social welfare, an active 
intervening state, broad participation from affected interests and a large public sector, 
had been successful. The regulatory agencies in Norway seemed to have developed 
without experiencing any major crisis; they coped well with technical tasks and had 
demonstrated good regulatory practice and a capacity for adaptation. 
In spite of this success, and the fact that Norway still performs very well today, the 
OECD report suggested that Norway should abandon its governance model and 
‘prepare for the future now’— a pretty sweeping and encompassing argument. It was 
more or less taken for granted that the integrated, reactive, ad hoc and piecemeal 
approach, which balances different values and goals, had come to an end and should be 
replaced by comprehensive, proactive, and systematic regulatory reforms. Without any 
profound analysis or convincing arguments, it was suggested that the well-functioning 
Norwegian model should be replaced by the new OECD orthodoxy (OECD 2003). The 
new recipe was to separate more strictly the regulatory role of the state from its roles as 
owner, policy-maker and commercial actor; to upgrade competition policy to make it 
the main goal; to deregulate and liberalize state monopolies; to reduce state ownership 
and commercialize public services; and to improve the performance, efficiency and 
effectiveness of public spending. Competitive neutrality was said to be essential, and it 
was recommended that the commitment to competition should be more wholehearted 
and that the government should retain less public control over the liberalization process. 
What was not discussed was that such a change might well be at odds with the 
Norwegian state’s traditional norms and values and that this would therefore hamper 
implementation, and that it would cause increased conflicts in society, thus reducing 
efficiency and effectiveness (Christensen and Lægreid 2006). Overall, one can question 
whether the new orthodoxy lacked realism in the Norwegian context. 
                                                 
4 Norway is not a member of EU, but a member of the European Economic Area (EEA) and therefore related to the 
four freedoms and the competition rules. 
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The drive for regulatory reforms of the OECD type came under the Conservative-
Center government of 2001–2005. In 2003 the government put forward a White Paper 
to parliament which aimed to establish an overarching and comprehensive regulatory 
policy. It upgraded competition policy to a main issue in regulatory policy and was 
influenced both by the OECD’s regulatory program and the European Economic Area 
Agreement, which gives Norway access to the EU internal market.  
The government underlined that regulatory agencies should have more unambiguous 
and non-overlapping roles as a result of increased horizontal specialization, thus 
breaking with the Norwegian tradition of integrating different roles and functions. 
Regulatory agencies were to increase their independence from the ministries, and 
political and professional premises were to be more clearly defined. Political 
considerations were to be confined primarily to establishing general norms via laws and 
rules, while leaving individual cases to be handled by competent professionals in the 
regulatory agencies. It was also proposed to change the complaints procedure by 
establishing independent bodies of appeal and to move seven regulatory agencies out of 
Oslo. It was argued that relocation would remove the agencies from the influence of 
other actors. Political steering and democratic control were hardly mentioned in the 
White Paper. There was also little discussion of why the need for more professional 
autonomy should carry more weight than political-democratic considerations.  
The White Paper was controversial in its making, and there were conflicts between 
ministries and with the affected agencies before it was issued. In parliament the 
governmental parties struck a deal with the two opposition parties (the Labour Party 
and the Socialist Left Party), modifying their proposal on some points. The proposal, 
stipulating that independent appeal boards should handle complaints or appeals, was 
withdrawn and postponed until the next election period. The other part of the deal was 
that the proposal to restrict the power of executive political leaders to instruct the 
agencies should be handled case by case, not as a general and generic principle. Thus, 
the government received support for the relocation of seven agencies, but the price it 
had to pay was a modification of the autonomy-oriented regulatory reform.  
However, this is not the last word on administrative reform. The general election of 
2005 brought a Centre-Left majority government to power in Norway with a more 
sceptical attitude towards the regulatory policy of the former government. There may 
well be a replay in the future on the autonomy issue when the government proposes 
reforms of individual regulatory agencies or when it comes to actual daily practice in 
these agencies – a subject to which we now turn.  
Theoretical Approaches: Tasks, Structure and 
Culture  
We will distinguish between three perspectives on organizations: a task-specific 
perspective, emphasizing the importance of the activities or tasks that civil servants in 
the different state agencies handle; a structural-instrumental perspective, focusing on the 
importance of formal organizational structure in general; and a cultural-institutional 
perspective, attributing variations in signals, contact and influence to informal 
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organizational features.5 These theoretical approaches are well-established in studies of 
public administration (Christensen 2003b; Christensen and Peters 1999; Pollitt et al. 
2004; Lægreid, Roness and Rubecksen, forthcoming), and we will expect them to be 
helpful in understanding variations in the relationship between central agencies and their 
superior political and administrative bodies. In focusing on regulatory tasks our main 
perspective is clearly the task-specific perspective. Variables derived from the other 
perspectives will be used mainly for control purposes. 
A  Task -Spec i f i c  P e r spec t i v e  
A task-specific perspective assumes that the requirements and constraints inherent in 
the primary tasks of the civil servants in the different agencies influence the regulation 
and control of those agencies (Pollitt et al. 2004). The main idea is that tasks matter and 
that we cannot discuss specific organizational structures and processes without taking 
into account the particular activities to which they apply. Task specificity and the nature 
of the actual work are important to understand the variation in actual autonomy and 
control of state agencies. The division of tasks may play an important role in the 
behaviour of state agencies and in how they are managed and controlled. Two well-
known parameters for defining agency tasks are to what degree their output and their 
outcome can be observed (Wilson 1989). Other important considerations are to what 
degree the tasks are politically sensitive, whether they involve major financial resources 
and whether they are subject to market competition (Pollitt et al. 2004). In this paper we 
are particularly interested in the importance of regulatory tasks and will try to narrow 
the perspective by focusing only on regulatory tasks. Political salience, which Pollitt et 
al. (2004) assign to a task-specific perspective, will here be seen as part of a cultural 
perspective.  
Thus, our main question based on a task-specific perspective will be how and to what 
extent civil servants engaged in regulatory tasks differ from other employees as regards 
signals, contact patterns and perceived influence? Studies of government agencies reveal 
that there are significant variations in behaviour according to the agencies’ tasks (Pollitt 
et al. 2004). According to the regulatory policy doctrines of today, regulatory agencies 
should be at arm’s length from ministries in order to reduce political uncertainty (cf. 
Christensen and Lægreid 2006b). The government delegates regulatory authority to 
experts and puts independent agencies at arm’s length from political executives to 
arbitrarily avoid short-term political interference and enhance the fairness and legitimacy 
of regulatory activities. The argument is that the body to which this authority is 
delegated should be independent and insulated in order to enhance the credibility of 
policy commitments (Majone 2001). The creation of autonomous agencies is justified by 
the perceived need to insulate certain activities from political influence. The prescription 
is that autonomous regulatory agencies can provide greater policy continuity, 
predictability, and consistency than cabinets and ministries, because they are not 
dependent on electoral returns. The delegation of power to an independent agency is a 
                                                 
5 Tasks can also be seen as part of a broad structural-instrumental perspective. In this paper we will, however, 
formulate a separate task-specific perspective, since we have a special focus on regulatory tasks.  
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way for governments to restrain themselves and to restrict their future freedom of 
action and also to reduce political opportunism. Thus, our main hypotheses are: 
H1: Civil servants engaged in regulatory tasks will generally be less sensitive to signals from political 
executives, from their parent ministry and from client and user groups; but they will be more 
sensitive to professional considerations than civil servants engaged in other types of tasks. 
H2:  Civil servants engaged in regulatory tasks will have less contact with political executives and 
their parent ministry than civil servants engaged in other types of tasks. 
H3: Civil servants engaged in regulatory tasks will report that their own agency is more important, 
and political executives and their parent ministry less important when making central decisions 
in their own field of work than civil servants engaged in other tasks. 
A  S t r u c t u r a l - I n s t r umen ta l  P e r spe c t i v e  
A main feature of many organizational approaches is the concept of bounded rationality 
(March and Simon 1958), which implies that decision-makers face problems of capacity 
and understanding and have to make some selections of decision-making premises. The 
formal organizational structure represents one important selection mechanism. Formal 
structure and procedures channel some actors, cleavages, problems, and solutions into 
decision-making processes in the public sector, while others are excluded. So 
‘organization is mobilization of bias’ (Schattschneider 1960).  
Gulick (1937) argues that there is a rather close connection between the formal 
structure chosen and the practice within and between organizations, underlining that the 
way formal authority is distributed among hierarchical levels is important for autonomy 
and control in practice, as is the horizontal division of tasks and authority. In a system 
characterized by independent agencies, based on the regulatory orthodoxy, this 
distribution is biased against the political executive and we will thus expect to find a 
rather low level of control of the agencies. The formal instruments of steering are 
diluted, the distance between administrative levels increases, and political signals have 
been shown to be weaker in independent bodies (Egeberg 2003). The agencies’ 
specialization into different functional areas will also affect their behaviour. It makes a 
difference whether central government is an integrated system under ministerial 
responsibility or a disintegrated system of autonomous or semi-autonomous 
organizations, for the latter weakens the levers of control. Furthermore, it makes a 
difference whether civil servants have a leadership position or not, because such 
positions are connected with obligations to perform control and coordination tasks. 
And it also makes a difference what sector or functional area the agency is located in 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2006a). In other words, formal structure matters. 
Based on this general perspective we will adopt two structural variables: hierarchical 
position and policy area. Most regulatory tasks, as well as other types of tasks, are related 
to specific policy areas. Here we take as our point of departure a categorization according 
to parent ministry, whereby we distinguish between economic, welfare, and other types of 
ministries (cf. Jacobsson, Lægreid and Pedersen 2003). In a recent study of delegation to 
independent regulatory agencies in Western Europe, Gilardi (2004) finds that regulators 
engaged in economic regulation are more independent than those engaged in social 
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regulation. Moreover, since norms of steering at arm’s length are stronger in the ‘harder’ 
than in the ‘softer’ policy areas, our hypothesis is: 
 
H4:  Civil servants working in agencies in the economic area will generally pay relatively more 
attention to professional considerations and signals from their own management, and less 
attention to signals from the parent ministry and political executives; they will have less contact 
with the parent ministry and political executives; and they will report that the influence of 
political executives and the parent ministry is weaker and that of their own agency stronger 
than civil servants working in the welfare state and other policy areas.  
 
When it comes to position we will distinguish between civil servants in leadership 
positions and other civil servants. It is a general finding that there are significant 
differences between civil servants in different hierarchical positions when it comes to 
how they assess signals and influence as well as contact patterns (Christensen and 
Lægreid 1998a, Lægreid and Olsen 1978). In line with these previous findings we would 
expect: 
 
H5:  Civil servants in leadership positions generally pay more attention to signals from the parent 
ministry and from political executives; have more contact with the parent ministry and political 
executives; and see more influence from the parent ministry and the political executive than civil 
servants in non-leadership positions. 
A  Cu l t u r a l - I n s t i t u t i ona l  P e r spe c t i v e  
A third set of factors concerns the historical and cultural traditions of political-
administrative systems (Selznick 1957). In institutional approaches informal norms, 
identities and the logic of appropriateness are important (March and Olsen 1989). Using 
this way of thinking, the point of departure would be that a certain style or way of 
regulating and controlling agencies has developed over time. Norms and values within 
agencies and central government and internal dynamics are important. Path 
dependencies constrain what tasks and authority it is appropriate and possible to move 
to agencies and how those agencies will operate. The reform road taken might reflect 
the main features of national institutional processes, where institutional ‘roots’ 
determine the path followed (Krasner 1988). Change is characterized by historical 
inefficiency and incrementalism. What happens in one agency is not a blueprint for 
developments in other agencies. Regulatory reforms reinforce underlying distinctive 
agency-specific or sector-specific trajectories and historical legacies (Thatcher and Stone 
Sweet 2002). Administrative traditions represent ‘filters’ producing different outcomes 
in different agencies. 
Certain styles of regulating and controlling agencies may have developed over the 
years, whereby agencies are seen as strong and integrated instruments of political 
development serving particular political goals. For a long time this was a dominant 
feature of the Norwegian administrative model (Grønlie 1999). Over the past years, 
however, this model has been challenged, and the culture has changed towards giving 
agencies more leeway and autonomy and allowing for looser coupling to political goals, 
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and it has gradually come to be taken for granted that agencies should be at arm’s length 
from the political executive. The extent of this cultural change will probably vary 
between agencies, potentially producing divergence. In some administrative cultures 
well-established informal contacts and networks between ministries and agencies may 
undermine their formal autonomy and create stronger integration between ministry and 
agency than expected from the new formal model (Jacobsson 1984; Pierre 2004). 
We will distinguish between three sets of indicators of political-administrative 
culture. First, the civil servants’ identification with their own profession and own 
agency; second, the level of mutual trust between agencies and the parent ministry; and 
third, whether the area of work is marked by a high level of agreement and consensus or 
whether it is conflict-ridden, and whether there is a high level of political salience and 
public debate about the cases that the civil servants are engaged in. Generally we will 
expect that: 
 
H6: Civil servants who identify strongly with their own agency and profession will generally pay less 
attention to signals from the parent ministry and from political executives, will have less contact 
with such bodies and also assess them as less important than civil servants whose identification 
with their own agency and profession is weak.  
 
H7:  Civil servants working in a political-administrative culture with low mutual trust, a high level 
of conflict and a high level of public debate will pay more attention to signals from their parent 
ministry and political executives, will have more contact with such bodies, and will assess them 
as them as more important and influential than civil servants working in a setting with a high 
level of mutual trust, a high level of consensus and low political salience. 
Da ta  and  me thodo l ogy  
Our method of studying reforms is based on three main elements. First, we focus on the 
response of individual civil servants in the agencies. Reforms, including regulatory 
reforms, are more than what leaders say they are and more than formal decisions. They 
are often a long and often winding road and their implementation ultimately depends on 
how individual civil servants at lower levels think about and respond to them 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2006).  
Second, we choose an extensive method to cover a lot of ground. In 2006 we had a 
large survey of civil servants in Norwegian central agencies, in which every third civil 
servant with at least one year tenure from executive officers to top civil servants 
received the questionnaire. 1516 persons in 49 central agencies answered and the 
response rate was 58 percent. On average there were 31 respondents from each agency, 
ranging from 112 in the largest agency to one in the smallest. In addition we used data 
from a similar survey of the agencies conducted in 1996, containing most of the same 
questions. This longitudinal approach makes it possible for us to examine developments 
over the past 10 years.  
Third, we take a broad empirical approach to the relationship between central 
agencies and their superior parent ministry and political executives. The dependent 
variables are divided into three clusters of questions. We asked the civil servants how 
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much significance they attached to different matters when executing their daily tasks. In 
2006 we listed ten different considerations and asked them to rank each of them on a 
scale from 1 (very important) to 5 (not important at all). In this paper we use five of these 
considerations: a) signals from political executives (the cabinet, minister, under-secretary 
of state), b) signals from the parent ministry, c) professional considerations, d) signals 
from external stakeholders, user groups and clients, and e) signals from the nearest 
superior or the top management of their own agency. 
We also asked the civil servants about their contact pattern. We asked them how 
often during the last year they had had contact with each of 18 different sets of actors or 
organizations, mainly public. We distinguished between weekly contacts, monthly 
contact, occasional contact and no contact. In this paper we focus on contact with 
political executives in the parent ministry, administrative contact with the parent 
ministry and contact with the legislature. 
And, we asked the respondents how they perceived influence. The question was 
“Can you say how important the following organizations or groups are when central 
decisions are made in your own field of work”. 23 organizations and groups were listed 
and for each of them the respondents were asked to rank them from 1 (very important) to 
5 (very unimportant). In this paper we use the following four organizations: own agency, 
parent ministry, the cabinet and the parliament. 
The profile of regulatory civil servants 
In this section we will present our main results concerning whether civil servants 
working mainly with regulatory tasks, control and surveillance are different from other 
civil servants when it comes to what kind of signals and factors they take into 
consideration in their daily work; how their contact patterns are with their own central 
agency, parent ministry and political executives; and how they perceive the influence of 
such bodies. Our main hypotheses are that, compared to other civil servants in central 
agencies, regulatory bureaucrats generally are less sensitive to signals from the parent 
ministry and political executives, that their contact patterns with such bodies are looser 
and that they perceive the influence of political and administrative executives as weaker. 
S i gna l s  and  c ons i de r a t i on s  
21% of the civil servants working in central agencies have control, supervision and 
regulation as a fairly large or dominant part of their work, 37 percent have such tasks as 
a small part of their work, while 42 percent report that they do not work on such issues. 
More important for many civil servants are planning and handling single cases not 
related to regulation. Coordination and information are also important tasks. In this 
paper we will analyse the 12 percent of civil servants in the agencies who have control 
and regulation as their main task, an increase from 9 percent in 1996. One implication 
from these figures is that there is a lot of overlap between different tasks. Many civil 
servants have multi-functional tasks. But, by focusing on the relatively small group 
reporting that regulatory tasks are their main tasks, we should be able to focus on the 
core group of regulatory bureaucrats in central agencies. 
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 When carrying out their daily work, professional considerations are overall the most 
important considerations for civil servants, and they are even more important for 
employees with regulatory tasks (Table 1). This indicates that they see themselves to a 
great extent as experts with a strong loyalty to their own profession, which shows a 
deep-rooted and traditional feature of the Norwegian public administration (Christensen 
2003). 
Table 1. The importance of different considerations for civil servants in agencies in carrying out their 
daily work – by main tasks. Percentage who assign the different considerations very high importance. 
2006. N=1516. 
 Regulatory 
tasks 
Other tasks Sign.  
(Pearson 
R) 
Professional considerations 
Signals from the top management of the agency 
Signals from the nearest superior 
Signals from the parent ministry 
Signals from stakeholders, user groups, clients 
Signals from the political leadership 
72 
49 
46 
34 
31 
23 
66 
60 
49 
42 
34 
39 
-.05 
.03 
.01 
  .06* 
.02 
    .08** 
 
Signals from political and administrative superiors are significantly less important. It is 
also interesting to see that signals from the parent ministry are almost as important as 
signals from the nearest superior or from the top management within the agency, 
indicating that the ministries clearly play a significant role. The regulatory civil servants 
are slightly more distant from stakeholders, clients and user groups than from their 
parent ministry when it comes to identification and loyalty, but less so than civil servants 
with non-regulatory tasks. But the fact that almost one third of the regulatory 
bureaucrats pay very much attention to such groups, and 23 percent pay much attention 
to signals from the regulatees indicates that they have a closer relationship with the 
regulatees than the new regulatory policy would lead one to expect. 
Least important are signals from political leaders. In this table we have only reported 
the “very important” responses on a scale from 1 (very important) to 5 (very 
unimportant). Very few report that the various actors are unimportant. The percentage 
who answer 1 or 2 ranges from 96 percent (professional considerations) to 59 percent 
(signals from the political leadership) for people working with regulatory tasks and from 
94 percent to 68 percent for civil servants working with other tasks. This pattern is fairly 
stable over time. In 1996, too, professional considerations were most important (69 
percent) and signals from the political leadership least important (26 percent ) 
(Christensen and Lægreid 1998b). 
Compared to civil servants with other main tasks, regulatory officials are significantly 
less concerned with signals from the parent ministry and from the political leadership. 
But they are not significantly more concerned with professional considerations (even 
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though they score higher), signals from stakeholders or signals from their own superiors 
within the agency. 
Based on these bivariate analyses H1 is partly supported. As expected from the 
model of regulatory orthodoxy, regulatory bureaucrats are less sensitive than other civil 
servants to signals from the parent ministry and from the cabinet, ministers and under-
secretaries of state. They are, however, not significantly less sensitive to signals from 
user groups or more sensitive to professional considerations than other civil servants.  
Con ta c t  pa t t e r n  
Regulatory executives have much less contact with political executives than with their 
parent ministry and very little contact with members of parliament (table 2). None have 
regulatory contact with the standing committee in the parliament on a monthly basis or 
more often and very few have such frequent contact with the political leadership in their 
parent ministry. They manage to keep the politicians at arm’s length. On the other hand, 
they have pretty frequent contact with the civil servants in their parent ministry, even 
though this contact is far less frequent than for the civil servants with non-regulatory 
tasks. This contact pattern has remained relatively stable over the past 10 years. There 
has, however, been a slight increase in contact with political executives in the ministry, 
something we would not have expected in view of the regulatory reform of 2002-2003.  
Table 2. Contact of civil servants in the agencies with different political and administrative actors - by 
main tasks. Percentage with contact at least once during the last year. Percentage. 2006. 
 Regulatory 
tasks 
Other 
tasks 
Sign. 
(Pearson 
R) 
Top management in own central agency 
Civil servants in own parent ministry 
Political leadership in the ministry 
Own standing committee in the parliament 
79 
57 
23 
7 
84 
74 
32 
13 
.08** 
.11** 
.07** 
.06* 
 
Table 2 also reveals that there are significant differences between civil servants working 
mainly on regulation, control and surveillance compared to employees with other main 
tasks. Regulatory civil servants have systematically less contact with their parent 
ministry, political executives and MPs than other civil servants. Thus, their external 
networks upwards to the parent ministry in general and to political executives and the 
legislature in particular are relatively loose compared to civil servants with other tasks. 
While only 16 percent of the employees working on regulatory tasks have contact with 
civil servants in their parent ministry once a month or more often, this is the case for 33 
percent of people working with other tasks.  
So far our hypothesis H2 is supported. In line with our expectations, regulatory civil 
servants have less frequent contact with their own parent ministry, political executives in 
government and members of parliament. But they also have less frequent contact with 
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the top management of their own agency, which may indicate a measure of internal 
independence, but this may not be an important difference since the frequency of 
contact is anyhow very high. 
Perceived influence 
Generally, the majority of agency employees report that their own agency is very 
important when central decisions are made within their own field of work. But the 
parent ministry is also seen as a powerful actor, not indicating a lot of independence. 
Political executives in the cabinet and parliament are, however, ranked as significantly 
less important. But generally, few report that these actors are unimportant. On a scale 
from 1 (very important) to 5 (very unimportant) 84 percent of people working on 
regulatory tasks rank their own agency as 1 or 2, compared to 79 percent ranking their 
parent ministry in these categories and 59 percent the parliament and the cabinet. In 
table 3 we have only reported the “very important” responses. Very few report that the 
various actors are unimportant. The percentage who answered 1 or 2 ranges from 96 
percent (professional considerations) to 59 percent (signals from the political leadership) 
for people working with regulatory tasks and from 94 percent to 68 percent for civil 
servants working with other tasks.6 The importance of their own agency has remained 
stable over time. 
Table 3. How important different actors are when central decisions are made within the agency 
employees’ own field of work. Percentage reporting that the actors are very important. 2006. 
 Regulatory tasks Other tasks Sign 
(Pearson R) 
Own central agency 
Parent ministry 
The parliament  
The cabinet 
57 
51 
31 
31 
58 
52 
43 
45 
.00 
.01 
.07* 
.07* 
 
Table 3 also reveals that, compared to other civil servants, employees with regulation, 
control and surveillance as their main tasks report that the parliament and the cabinet 
are significantly less important when central decisions are made. Our hypothesis H3 gets 
some support. In line with our expectations political executives in the parliament and 
the cabinet are perceived as less influential among regulatory bureaucrats than among 
other civil servants in the agencies. However, there are no differences when it comes to 
the importance of parent ministry and own central agency. 
Summing up, the bivariate analyses show that civil servants with regulatory tasks pay 
great attention to professional considerations, they have close contact with the top 
                                                 
6 The percentages for people working on other tasks are 85 % for own central agency, 81% for parent ministry, 65 % 
for the parliament and 69 % for the cabinet. 
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leadership in their own agency and they rank their own central agency as the most 
powerful when central decisions are made. There is also a relatively close contact pattern 
with the parent ministry which is seen as rather powerful when central decisions are 
made. Political executives are more at arm’s length when it comes to signals and contact 
patterns as well as influence, indicating that regulatory activities are seen more as 
administrative than political. This picture has remained fairly stable over time and was 
not dramatically different in 2006 compared to 10 years earlier, despite Norway’s 
substantial regulatory reform of 2002-2003.  
There are also significant differences between executives working mainly with 
regulatory tasks compared to civil servants with other tasks. People occupied with 
regulation, control and surveillance pay less heed to signals from the parent ministry and 
from political executives, they have looser contact with such bodies and generally see 
them as less powerful when central decisions are made. 
The importance of structural and cultural features 
In this section we will discuss the importance of structural and cultural features and 
check whether the significant bivariate correlations between regulatory tasks and signals, 
contact patterns and perceived influence hold when these factors are accounted for. 
Based on these findings we will discuss the remaining hypotheses (H4-H7). The relative 
explanatory power of the different independent variables concerning the relationship 
between agencies and political executives and the parent ministry is summed up in table 
4. Our general result from the multivatiate analyses is that the independent variables 
explain only a small part of the variation in the dependent variables. Perhaps more 
important for us, however, is whether the main pattern revealed in the bivariate analyses 
of civil servants with regulatory tasks is confirmed after controlling for other structural 
factors and cultural features. 
Table 4 shows, first, that the effect of regulatory tasks is reduced when other 
structural features and cultural factors are controlled for. There is, however, a significant 
effect of regulatory tasks on contact patterns with the parent ministry. Second, other 
structural factors, such as policy area and hierarchical position make a difference. Civil 
servants in central agencies in the area of market, economic activity, business and 
industry pay less attention to signals from the parent ministry and political executives. 
They have less frequent contact with such bodies and the perceived influence of the 
Cabinet and the parliament in their own field of work is seen as lower than it is by civil 
servants in other policy areas such as the welfare state and justice. Thus our hypothesis 
H4 is mainly supported.7  
Third, there is also a significant effect of position. Civil servants in leadership 
positions pay more attention to signals from the parent ministry and political executives, 
and they have more frequent contact with such bodies than executive officers. This is 
natural since that is part of their leadership job and they are structurally closer to these 
                                                 
7 There is, as expected, also a significant bivariate correlation between policy area and signals from management in 
own agency (R=.10**), but no significant relation to professional signals (R=.03).  
THE REGULATORY  ORTHODOXY  IN  PRACTICE WORKING PAPER  6  -  2007  
  21
actors. There is, however, no significant difference between people in different positions 
when it comes to perceived influence. Thus our hypothesis H5 is partly supported. 
Table 4. Summary of regression analysis by task-specific, structural and cultural features affecting 
signals and considerations, contact patterns and perceived influence. Standardized Beta coefficients. 
Linear regressions. 
 Signals and 
considerations 
Contact pattern Perceived 
influence 
 Parent 
ministry 
Political 
executives 
Political 
executives 
Parent 
ministry 
Parliament Cabinet Parlia-
ment 
Tasks: 
Regulatory tasks 
 
.01 
 
.04 
 
.05 
 
.07* 
 
.03 
 
.04 
 
.04 
Structure: 
-
Economy/market 
area 
-Position 
 
 
.16** 
-.09** 
 
 
.16** 
-.12** 
 
 
.06* 
-.13** 
 
 
.18** 
-.21** 
 
 
.01 
-.12** 
 
 
.15** 
-.05 
 
 
.12* 
-01 
Culture: 
-Professional 
identification 
-Agency 
identification 
-Mutual trust 
-Public debate 
-Conflict 
 
 
.01 
 
-.11** 
-.07* 
-.16** 
-.03 
 
 
.01 
 
-.09** 
-.01 
-.22** 
.02 
 
 
-.01 
 
-.01 
-.03 
-.21** 
.05 
 
 
.00 
 
-.05 
-.05 
-.22** 
.04 
 
 
-.01 
 
-.06* 
-.05 
-.21** 
.04 
 
 
.01 
 
-.11** 
.02 
-.24** 
.01 
 
 
.01 
 
-.13** 
.01 
-.23** 
.00 
Multiple R 
R2 
Adjusted R2 
F statistics 
Significance of F 
.30 
.09 
.09 
14.557 
.000 
.34 
.11 
.11 
18.324 
.000 
.28 
.08 
.07 
12.145 
.000 
.33 
.10 
.10 
21.626 
.000 
.27 
.07 
.07 
11.039 
.000 
.33 
.11 
.10 
14.232 
.000 
.31 
.10 
.09 
12.510 
.000 
 
Regulatory tasks:  0) not main task 1) main task; Economy/market area: 0) other areas 1) Economy/market area; 
Position: 0) executive officer 1) manager; Professional Identification: 0) not strong 1) strong/very strong; Agency 
identification: 0) not strong, 1) strong/very strong; Mutual trust: 0) not strong 1) strong/very strong; Public debate: 0) low, 
1) high; Conflict: 0) High 1) Low 
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Forth, cultural features also make a difference. Civil servants who identify strongly with 
their own agency tend to pay less attention to signals from the parent ministry and 
political executives, they have less contact with the parliament, and the perceived 
influence of the cabinet and the parliament is lower than for bureaucrats whose 
identification with their own agency is weak. Professional identification does, however, 
not have a significant influence on the dependent variables. Thus our hypothesis H6 is 
only partly supported.  
Fifth, the most important overall factor is whether there is a high level of public 
debate or not about the cases the civil servants are working on. This factor has a strong 
and significant effect on all our dependent variables. Bureaucrats working on cases with 
high political salience tend to pay more attention to signals from political executives and 
their parent ministry, they have more frequent contact with such bodies, and the 
perceived influence of the cabinet and the parliament is much higher than for civil 
servants working on issues involving little public debate. There is also an effect of 
mutual trust between own agency and parent ministry. Civil servants with a high level of 
mutual trust tend to pay more attention to signals from the parent ministry. When 
controlling for other factors there is no significant effect of conflict. Thus, our 
hypothesis H7 gets partial support. 
Summing up, the explanatory power of our perspectives is relatively weak, but most 
of the significant effects support our hypotheses. The effect of regulatory task is, 
however, reduced when other structural and cultural factors are controlled for. The 
most important variable to understand the relationship between agencies and their 
political and administrative superiors is the degree of political salience and also policy 
area. Table 5 sums up our main results related to the main hypotheses. 
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Table 5. Main hypotheses and empirical results in the survey of civil servants in agencies.2006. 
Main hypotheses Main results 
H1: Civil servants with regulatory tasks are less 
sensitive to signals from political executives, 
parent ministry, client groups and more 
sensitive to professional signals 
Partly confirmed in bivaraite analyses 
concerning political executives and parent 
ministry, but not sustained in multivariate 
analyses 
H2:Civil servants with regulatory tasks have 
less contact with political executives and parent 
ministry 
Confirmed when it comes to parent ministry, 
but only bivariate significance concerning 
political executives 
H3: Civil servants with regulatory tasks see own 
agency as more important and political 
executives (parliament and cabinet) and parent 
ministry as less important concerning influence 
Partly confirmed concerning parliament and 
cabinet in bivaraite analyses, but not 
sustained in multivariate analyses 
H4: Civil servants with regulatory tasks working 
in agencies in economic area will overall see 
signals from, contact with and influence from 
professional considerations and own agency as 
more important than from parent ministry and 
political executives. 
Confirmed. 
H5: Civil servants in leadership positions will 
overall score highest on signals from, contact 
with and perceived influence of parent ministry 
and political executives. 
Partly confirmed for signals and contacts 
H6: Civil servants identifying strongly with own 
agency and profession will score lowest on 
signals from, contact with and perceived 
influence of parent ministry and political 
executives 
Partly confirmed for signals and influence 
H7: Civil servants in a political-administrative 
culture with low mutual trust, a high level of 
conflict and high level of public debate will score 
higher on signals from, contact with and 
perceived influence of parent ministry and 
political executives. 
Partly confirmed, but only for public debate, 
where importance is strong 
Discussion 
A general finding in this paper is that there is a relatively close relationship between 
agencies in general and their parent ministry and political executives. In contrast to the 
new regulatory orthodoxy, the agencies in general are not isolated from their 
administrative and political superiors. This is the case for civil servants working with 
both regulatory tasks and other tasks. Their autonomy seems to be bounded. They pay 
particularly great attention to signals from the administrative leadership in their parent 
ministry, have a well developed contact patterns upwards and generally assess their 
superior as having an important role to play when central decisions are made within 
their own field of work. These findings show quite consistently the historical tradition 
of semi-autonomous agencies in Norway, balancing control and autonomy, based on a 
modified Swedish model (Christensen and Roness 1999). Because the political 
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leadership in the ministries and the cabinet has capacity problems, contacts with the 
agencies often go through the administrative leadership and civil servants in the relevant 
department. Contact with parliament very much follows the parliamentary chain, i.e. 
going through the ministries. The majority of civil servants working in agencies in any 
case pay a lot of attention to signals from political leaders and assess political executives 
as important when central decisions are made, even if signals from politicians are paid 
less attention than signals from administrative leaders in their own agency.  
It is also interesting to note that even people who have regulatory tasks as their main 
function tend to pay quite a lot of attention to signals from user groups, clients and 
stakeholders. This might indicate that the regulatory bureaucrats have closer relations to 
the regulatees than the new regulatory policy would suggest. This may indicate that 
moving agencies further away from the ministry makes them closer to and more 
exposed to client groups. Thus, in general the practice of regulatory agencies is 
somewhat loosely coupled to the ideal type of regulatory agencies as promoted by the 
new regulatory orthodoxy. The regulatory reform of 2002-2003, did not bring about a 
radical change in the situation compared to ten years ago, and today we see more 
similarities than differences in the civil servants’ orientations and in their daily 
relationships with their superior political and administrative bodies. 
One finding that does, however, support the expectations raised by the new 
regulatory policy is that professional considerations get a top ranking when carrying out 
the daily work. This is the strongest of all signals. However, this is not a product of the 
new regulatory policy. It has been a longstanding and traditional norm within the 
Norwegian civil service since the 1840s-50s (Christensen 2003). There is also no 
significant difference between civil servants working on regulatory issues and other civil 
servants in their high ranking of professional considerations.  
That said, when it comes to variations between people working with regulatory tasks 
and civil servants with other tasks, there are some systematic differences as the new 
regulatory policy would lead one to expect. Compared to other civil servants people 
with control, supervisory and regulatory work as their main tasks pay somewhat less 
attention to signals from their parent ministry and from the political leadership; they 
have less frequent contact with such bodies and report that political executives are 
somewhat less important when central decisions are made. Since this has not changed 
much over time, this may indicate that regulatory tasks and regulatory agencies have 
enjoyed relatively higher autonomy from the ministries for some time because 
regulation is more apparently connected to specialized areas of technical expertise and 
therefore professional considerations.  
A main finding is that the most important factor when it comes to explaining the 
relationship between agencies and political and administrative superiors is the degree of 
political salience or public debate involved in the cases civil servants are working on (cf. 
Pollitt et al 2004). The degree of public debate is generally much more important for 
understanding the variation in the relationship between agencies and their political and 
administrative superiors than the degree of mutual trust between them or the general 
degree of conflict in the policy area. This may be the effect of increased politicization of 
a policy area and of increased efforts to exert political control in crisis situations, as seen 
in the immigration policy field in Norway (Christensen, Lægreid and Ramslien 2006). 
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But agencies may also seek a closer relationship with the ministries over controversial 
issues in order to put their decisions on a sounder footing, and avoid criticism and 
media exposure. 
But policy area also makes an important difference. As might be expected from the 
regulatory reforms, civil servants working in agencies in the area of trade and business, 
economic issues and market have their parent ministry and political executive more at 
arm’s length than people working in the softer areas of welfare state issues or other 
policy sectors. This may reflect the fact that policies in these areas are becoming more 
narrow and economically oriented, which makes it easier to keep the politicians away. 
There is also a significant effect of hierarchical position when it comes to signals and 
contact patterns. Civil servants in leadership positions in the agencies pay more 
attention to signals from the parent ministry and from political executives and they also 
have a more frequent contact pattern with such bodies than administrative executives. 
In this respect they adhere closely to the formal duties and obligations of their 
leadership roles. 
It is, however, interesting to observe that professional identification cannot explain 
much of the variation in the relationship with political and administrative superiors. One 
possible explanation for this may be the fact that professional considerations are so 
strong generally in the civil service that they create little variation. Identification with 
own agency seems more important than identification with own profession, showing the 
importance of combining cultural and structural features.  
Conclusion 
In this paper we have shown that the regulatory practice of civil servants in Norwegian 
central agencies is much more complex than the OECD discourse and prescriptions 
suggest. We cannot talk about role purification or about changes that are obviously 
attributable to the regulatory reform of 2002-2003. On the one hand, they have a closer 
relationship with political and administrative superiors and also with the regulatees than 
suggested by the OECD regulatory policy. They are by no means insulated from other 
actors. On the other hand, in line with the OECD prescriptions professional 
considerations are very important, but they do not produce much variation when 
compared with civil servants performing non-regulatory tasks. 
There is also less difference between regulatory employees and other agency 
employees than we would expect from the OECD discourse, and the importance of 
having regulatory tasks or not is less important than structural and cultural features if 
one wants to understand the relationship between central agencies and their superior 
political and administrative bodies. The level of political debate, policy area, agency 
identification and administrative position seem to be more important to understand the 
relationship than involvement in regulatory tasks. The main picture is that there is a 
loose coupling between the OECD regulatory policy ideal and regulatory practice in 
central agencies when it comes to the relationship between the ‘semi-autonomous’ 
agencies and their parent ministry and political leaders.  
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What are the possible implications of this study for other countries? Can the findings 
be relevant outside Norway? The empirical focus on Norway provides insight into how 
Nordic countries’ regulatory experience differs from that of their Anglo-Saxon 
counterparts. The Norwegian welfare state model with its strong consensus orientation, 
high level of mutual trust and a longstanding unified agency model represents an 
administrative cultural and structural design that is at odds with the OECD model and 
prescriptions and makes it difficult to apply them in a straightforward manner 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2006b).  
One similarity between Norway and other European counties is the importance of 
contextual factors when it comes to adopting independent regulatory agencies (Thatcher 
2007), but in contrast to many elected politicians in other European countries, the 
Norwegian politicians and parent ministries seem to use their power more actively to 
influence the daily work of central agencies (Thatcher 2005). This is especially the case 
for issues involving a high degree of political salience or public debate. Another 
similarity between Norwegian regulatory practice and what has been observed in Anglo-
Saxon countries, such as the United Kingdom, is the approach to excluding politicians 
and establishing a more purely evidence-based mode of policy making. What happens is 
not so much de-politizing as arena shifting (Flinders and Buller 2006). Politics tends not 
to disappear and it is more a question of finding a new balance between professional 
signals, agency-specific identity and signals from the parent ministry and political bodies. 
A comparative study of regulatory organizations and practice in different policy areas in 
Norway shows quite clearly that internal tension between professional considerations, 
conflicts with actors being regulated, anticipated reactions from regulatory agencies, and 
political interference and importance are more common than purely regulatory roles and 
so-called evidence-based and objective decision-making (Christensen and Lægreid 
2006b). Regulatory processes seem much more muddy and complex than the orthodox 
regulatory model outlines. 
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